Mittwoch, 19. Januar 2022
"I-Sharing" alias "ego functioning" as a remedy against existential isolation
ahc, 09:30h
In circles of experimental existential psychology, authors have recently found renewed interest in the distinction between me (my ascriptions I have about myself, often also called self-concept) and I (the current whole of experiencing within our never-ending stream of consciousness at any given moment in time), an idea that dates back to founder of American psychology, William James.
In a series of experiments (among others, priming studies), Elizabeth Pinel and her colleagues found that during interpersonal encounters me-sharing (e.g., my perceptions of being similar to another female German who likes Wagner music) is actually acting as a proxy for I-sharing (e.g., a spontaneous shared deep breath when suddenly hearing the Tannhaeuser theme), which in turn reliefs us temporarily from our sadness resulting from our unavoidable existential loneliness in the world (existential isolation).
In other words, we seek me-sharing experiences with others because we (whether rightfully so or not) believe that me-sharing increases the likelihood for I-sharing, which, in turn, gives us, for a moment, the illusion that we are not existentially isolated beings who cannot ever know the other literally. And, vice versa, when being faced acutely with the awareness of our existential isolation, we actually seek out I-sharers rather than me-sharers.
Translated into Gestalt therapy's langue, the me corresponds to a person's personality function of selfing, the relatively speaking more stable ascriptions I hold about myself at any given moment and which have become sedimented in my background, and the I to the ego-function of selfing, the agentic force during contacting and full-contacting episodes within a particular contact cycle in the here-and-now. While the authors do not mention what, in Gestalt terms, we call it-functioning or, in contemporary discourse possibly also aesthetic and relational functioning (while they look at both aspects of self in a relational context), they conclude:
"We may never experience existential connectedness in a literal sense, but I-sharing brings us breathtakingly close."
and
"[C]linical jpsychologists might find value in developing ways to reach their clients at the level of subjective experience." (p. 372)
In this respect, Gestalt therapy has seemingly found that value from the start. I remain curious what further information about that value experimental existential psychology will bring into our awareness as therapists.
Source:
Pinel, E. C., Long, A. E., Landau, M. J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). I-sharing, the problem of existential isolation, and their implications for interpersonal and intergroup phenomena. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. A. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental existential psychology (pp. 358?374). Guilford Press.
In a series of experiments (among others, priming studies), Elizabeth Pinel and her colleagues found that during interpersonal encounters me-sharing (e.g., my perceptions of being similar to another female German who likes Wagner music) is actually acting as a proxy for I-sharing (e.g., a spontaneous shared deep breath when suddenly hearing the Tannhaeuser theme), which in turn reliefs us temporarily from our sadness resulting from our unavoidable existential loneliness in the world (existential isolation).
In other words, we seek me-sharing experiences with others because we (whether rightfully so or not) believe that me-sharing increases the likelihood for I-sharing, which, in turn, gives us, for a moment, the illusion that we are not existentially isolated beings who cannot ever know the other literally. And, vice versa, when being faced acutely with the awareness of our existential isolation, we actually seek out I-sharers rather than me-sharers.
Translated into Gestalt therapy's langue, the me corresponds to a person's personality function of selfing, the relatively speaking more stable ascriptions I hold about myself at any given moment and which have become sedimented in my background, and the I to the ego-function of selfing, the agentic force during contacting and full-contacting episodes within a particular contact cycle in the here-and-now. While the authors do not mention what, in Gestalt terms, we call it-functioning or, in contemporary discourse possibly also aesthetic and relational functioning (while they look at both aspects of self in a relational context), they conclude:
"We may never experience existential connectedness in a literal sense, but I-sharing brings us breathtakingly close."
and
"[C]linical jpsychologists might find value in developing ways to reach their clients at the level of subjective experience." (p. 372)
In this respect, Gestalt therapy has seemingly found that value from the start. I remain curious what further information about that value experimental existential psychology will bring into our awareness as therapists.
Source:
Pinel, E. C., Long, A. E., Landau, M. J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). I-sharing, the problem of existential isolation, and their implications for interpersonal and intergroup phenomena. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. A. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental existential psychology (pp. 358?374). Guilford Press.
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Donnerstag, 17. Juni 2021
Similar representations of self and other in the brain
ahc, 10:26h
"[I]t is interesting to note that our ability to represent our own thoughts and represent another's thoughts are intimately tied together and may have similar origins within the brain. The fact that there seems to be a partial overlap between self-processing and processing of others fits well with the old adage of 'putting ourselves in another person's shoes?." (p. 532)
Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and other: A social cognitive neuroscience view. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 7 (12), 527-533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.10.004
Decety, J., & Sommerville, J. A. (2003). Shared representations between self and other: A social cognitive neuroscience view. TRENDS in Cognitive Sciences, 7 (12), 527-533. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2003.10.004
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Mittwoch, 10. März 2021
How our consciousness constantly changes
ahc, 09:48h
"As you embark on this journey [of understanding consciousness, ahc], be kind to yourself. Be aware of the self-limiting beliefs that we allow to weigh us down and rebuke them daily. You are not the sum of your past, and you are certainly not stuck in the state of consciousness that you now live. If there is one thing that we do know about consciousness, it is that it is constantly changing. Perhaps it is this fluidity that has caused our great challenges, as a species, in pinning it down, but it is definitely this changeable nature that we should celebrate. If our consciousness today does not have to be the same tomorrow as it is today, then the possibilities are endless.The most likely scenario, looking at all of the various theories, philosophies, and schools of thought around consciousness, is that the truth about consciousness lies in an amalgamation of all of these things. How we piece together those answers may not be a group journey, but rather an individual one. Although our consciousness may be linked as a species, it is certainly still very individual and based on our own experiences, lenses, and biases. Therefore one perception of consciousness will never be the same as another, and, indeed, would we want it to be? Perhaps we don't need a final definition for consciousness? Maybe its definition is its changeable nature. The idea that we all see life through our own lenses is a very empowering one, because that means that you can change those lenses. Like a kaleidoscope, you can switch the lens and change your view."
From the conclusion of:
Browne, J. (2020). Understanding the human mind. The pursuit of consciousness. Jason Brown.
From the conclusion of:
Browne, J. (2020). Understanding the human mind. The pursuit of consciousness. Jason Brown.
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