In circles of experimental existential psychology, authors have recently found renewed interest in the distinction between me (my ascriptions I have about myself, often also called self-concept) and I (the current whole of experiencing within our never-ending stream of consciousness at any given moment in time), an idea that dates back to founder of American psychology, William James.

In a series of experiments (among others, priming studies), Elizabeth Pinel and her colleagues found that during interpersonal encounters me-sharing (e.g., my perceptions of being similar to another female German who likes Wagner music) is actually acting as a proxy for I-sharing (e.g., a spontaneous shared deep breath when suddenly hearing the Tannhaeuser theme), which in turn reliefs us temporarily from our sadness resulting from our unavoidable existential loneliness in the world (existential isolation).
In other words, we seek me-sharing experiences with others because we (whether rightfully so or not) believe that me-sharing increases the likelihood for I-sharing, which, in turn, gives us, for a moment, the illusion that we are not existentially isolated beings who cannot ever know the other literally. And, vice versa, when being faced acutely with the awareness of our existential isolation, we actually seek out I-sharers rather than me-sharers.

Translated into Gestalt therapy's langue, the me corresponds to a person's personality function of selfing, the relatively speaking more stable ascriptions I hold about myself at any given moment and which have become sedimented in my background, and the I to the ego-function of selfing, the agentic force during contacting and full-contacting episodes within a particular contact cycle in the here-and-now. While the authors do not mention what, in Gestalt terms, we call it-functioning or, in contemporary discourse possibly also aesthetic and relational functioning (while they look at both aspects of self in a relational context), they conclude:

"We may never experience existential connectedness in a literal sense, but I-sharing brings us breathtakingly close."

and

"[C]linical jpsychologists might find value in developing ways to reach their clients at the level of subjective experience." (p. 372)

In this respect, Gestalt therapy has seemingly found that value from the start. I remain curious what further information about that value experimental existential psychology will bring into our awareness as therapists.


Source:
Pinel, E. C., Long, A. E., Landau, M. J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). I-sharing, the problem of existential isolation, and their implications for interpersonal and intergroup phenomena. In J. Greenberg, S. L. Koole, & T. A. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental existential psychology (pp. 358?374). Guilford Press.